Abstract. We introduce delegatable functional signatures (DFS) which support the delegation of signing capabilities to another party, called the evaluator, with respect to a functionality F. In a DFS, the signer of a message can choose an evaluator, specify how the evaluator can modify the signature without voiding its validity, allow additional input, and decide how the evaluator can further delegate its capabilities. Technically, DFS unify several seemingly dierent signature primitives, including functional signatures and policy-based signatures (PKC'14), sanitizable signatures, identity based signatures, and blind signatures. We characterize the instantiability of DFS with respect to the corresponding security notions of unforgeability and privacy. On the positive side we show that privacy-free DFS can be constructed from one-way functions. Furthermore, we show that unforgeable and private DFS can be constructed from doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations. On the negative side we show that the previous result is optimal regarding its underlying assumptions presenting an impossibility result for unforgeable private DFS from one-way permutations.
Introduction
Digital signature schemes resemble the idea of a hand written signature in the sense that a signer signs messages with his private key sk sig and anybody can check the validity of the signature using the corresponding public key pk sig .
The elementary security property is unforgeability under chosen message attacks which says that an adversary cannot compute a signature on a fresh message, even if he has observed q signatures on q messages of his choice [31] . This security denition models the idea of non-malleability for digital signatures: The adversary should not be able to modify any signature such that it veries for a dierent message.
For many emerging applications, such as the delegation of computation on authenticated data, the basic notion is insucient and a controlled form of malleability would be desirable. Consider as an example a company S that wishes to outsource the computation on authenticated data to untrusted parties (resp. to parties that may further delegate the computation to sub-contractors), called the evaluators, without handing out any secret key. For each data, S chooses a set of allowed functions F that can be applied. . . . any function f ∈ F chosen by S, or delegate subsets F ⊆ F to other evaluators. We allow S to restrict the number of delegations, as well as the order in which functions can be applied. The chain computation should be publicly veriable which means that everybody can verify that:
The computation was based on the original data of S.
Only the functions chosen by S were applied to the data (in the right order, if specied).
Any delegation of computation by an evaluator A to another evaluator (a third party B or any sub-contractor A i ) has been authorized by S and A.
We refer to Figure 1 for an example structure of delegation. We consider the following security notions: Unforgeability says that malicious evaluators can only apply the functions(s) they were allowed to apply, e.g.: B 1 can only apply F B1 ⊆ F B ⊆ F A and further delegate sets of functions F B2 ⊆ F B1 . Privacy says that given the result of a computation, it is not possible to gain information about the computed functions or their input (or the parties that did the computation): To an observer, the signature σ B2 computed by B 2 for a message m B2 is indistinguisable from a signature σ for m B2 computed by S. Privacy is a useful and desirable property in many applications as it hides the business structure of the (sub-)contractor and still allows to verify the correctness of the computation. Traditional signature schemes as well as their malleable variants are not suitable in this setting. In this paper we close this gap by introducing the concept of delegatable functional signatures.
Our Contribution
Our main contributions are as follows. First, we introduce delegatable functional signatures (DFS) . This primitive supports highly controlled, ne-grained delegation of signing capabilities to designated third parties and is general enough to cover several malleable signature schemes. Second, we present strong security notions for unforgeability and privacy that also take into account insider adversaries. Third, we provide a complete charaterization regarding the achievability of our security notions based on general complexity assumptions. In the following we discuss each contribution comprehensively.
Delegatable Functional Signatures. Delegatable functional signatures support the delegation of signing capabilities to another party, called the evaluator, with respect to a functionality F. The evaluator may compute valid signatures on messages m and delegate capabilities f to another evaluator with key k whenever (f , m ) ← F(f, α, k, m) for a value α of the evaluators choice. Thus, the functionality describes how an evaluator can perform the following two tasks.
Malleability. The designated evaluator can derive a signature on m from a signature on m, if (f , m ) ← F(f, α, k, m), where the evaluator picks α and k himself.
Delegatability. The designated evaluator can delegate signing capabilities f on his signature on m , to other parties, if (f , m ) ← F(f, α, k, m), where k is the key of another evaluator (or his own key, if he wants to apply several functions successively) and where the evaluator picks α himself.
Example 1 (Malleability). Suppose that a sender S wants to sign a document, but allow another entity A to ll in information in a few elds. S chooses f to describe the places where information can be added, as well as which information can be added (e.g., 16 characters) without harming the validity of the signature.
A chooses the elds and the information it wishes to ll in by choosing the corresponding value for α, and he derives a signature on m , where (·, m ) ← F(f, α, k, m).
Example 2 (Delegatability). Suppose that a sender S wants to restrict how A can delegate further capabilities. Her choice of f additionally describes that after lling in information, certain parts of the document can be censored without harming the validity of the signature, but no further information can be added. 1 After lling in information, A may delegate the censoring to B, but impose restrictions on which part of the document may be censored by choosing the corresponding value for α. Then, A and delegates the corresponding capabilities f to B, where (f , ·) ← F(f, α, k B , m).
Our denition also covers signing capabilities for fresh messages. If a sender S wants to give A the capability to sign certain messages in his name, he can simply generate a signature σ fresh for a new (empty) message and use f to specify which capabilities A has, i.e., which signatures he can derive from σ fresh .
Security Model for DFS. A central contribution of this paper are the formal denitions of unforgeability and privacy. On an abstract level, these notions resemble the well known intuition: Unforgeability means that no signatures can be forged, except on messages within a certain class. Privacy means that derived signatures are indistinguishable from fresh signatures. However, nding meaningful and achievable denitions for DFS is rather challenging, because the signatures are malleable by nature and we are also considering the multi-party setting:
1 If a PKI exists, S can additionally add descriptions of the evaluators that are allowed to do this second round of processing.
Unforgeability In a DFS scheme the signer species for every signature the degree of malleability and how this malleability can be delegated. Unforgeability is then captured by a transitive closure that contains all messages that can trivially be derived.
Privacy Our notion of privacy follows the idea that all information about signatures should be hidden (except for the message). This is captured in an indistinguishability game where the adversary can hand in a signature of his own. Either this signature is treated exactly as the adversary species it (modied by evaluators of his choice, possibly under keys of the adversary possesses) or a new signature for the same (resulting) message is created.
For both unforgeability and privacy we present three dierent security notions for DFS schemes: The weakest one, unforgeability/privacy against outsider attacks, holds only for adversaries that do not have access to the private key of an evaluator. The second one, unforgeability/privacy against insider attacks, assumes that an evaluator is malicious and possesses a honestly generated evaluator key. The third one, unforgeability/privacy against strong insider attacks assumes a malicious evaluator that might generate its own keys.
Unifying signature primitives. Theorem 2 (Impossibility, informal). Private unforgeable delegatable functional signatures secure against insider adversaries cannot be constructed from one-way functions in a black-box way.
Related Work
(Delegatable) Anonymous Credentials. In anonymous credential systems users can prove the possession of a credential without revealing their identity.
We view this very successful line of research as orthogonal to our work: Credentials can be applied on top of a signature scheme in order to prove properties that are specied in an external logic. In fact, one could combine delegatable functional signatures with credentials in order to partially leak the delegation chain, while allowing to issue or modify credentials in an anonymous but controlled way. Anonymous credential systems have been investigated extensively, e.g., [16, 17, 21, 22, 10, 23, 20, 28] . The main dierence between delegatable anonymous credential schemes, such as [9, 1] , and our approach is that delegation is done by extending the proof chain (and thus leaking information about the chain). Restricting the properties of the issuer in a credential system has been considered in [8] . However, they only focus on access control proofs and their proof chain is necessarily visible, whereas our primitive allows for privacypreserving schemes.
Malleable Signature Schemes. A limited degree of malleability for digital signatures has been considered in many dierent ways (we refer to [24] for a nice overview). We group malleable signature schemes into three categories: publicly modiable signatures, sanitizable signatures and proxy signatures. Publicly modiable signatures do not consider a special secret key for modifying signatures, which means that everyone with access to the correct public key and one or more valid message-signature pairs can derive new valid message-signature pairs. There are schemes that allow for redacting signatures [38, 33, 37, 18] that allow for deriving valid signatures on parts (or subsets) of the message m. There are schemes that allow for deriving subset and union relations on signed sets [33] , linearly homomorphic signature schemes [29, 14, 5] and schemes that allow for evaluating polynomial functions [13, 25] . Libert et al. combine linearly homomorphic signatures with structure preserving signatures [36] . However, known publicly modiable signature schemes only consider static functions or predicates (one function or predicate for every scheme) and leave the signer little room for bounding a class of functions to a specic message. As the signatures can be modied by everyone with access to public information, they do not allow for a concept of controlled delegation.
Sanitizable signature schemes [3, 19] In a functional signature scheme, the signer hands out keys sk f for functions f to allow the recipient to sign all messages in the range of f . Similar to our contributions, they dene notions of unforgeability and privacy (called function privacy) and present several constructions for functional digital signatures. One of their constructions also shows that functional signatures can be build from one-way functions provided that one is willing to give up privacy. They furthermore show how to construct one-round delegation schemes out of a functional digital signature scheme.
While our work is closely related to both works, it diers in several aspects:
First, we not only consider the controlled malleability of the signature, but also support the delegation of signing capabilities. Second, while we also show for our notions that unforgeable-only DFS schemes can be build from one-way functions, we additionally show that private DFS schemes can not be constructed from from one-way permutations (see Section 4). We believe that our impossibility result should also hold for functional signatures [15] , as well as for policy-based signatures [11] , because our impossibility result does not rely on the delegation property of our scheme. Furthermore, DFS signatures allow for authenticated chain computations. In the extended version [6] we compare delegatable functional signature schemes to functional digital signature schemes and policy-based signature schemes and show how to construct them out of a delegatable functional signature scheme. Whether the converse is possible is unknown.
Delegatable Functional Signatures
Delegatable functional signatures support the delegation of signing capabilities to another party, called the evaluator, with respect to a functionality F. The evaluator may compute valid signatures on messages m and delegate capabilities f to another evaluator with key k whenever (f , m ) ← F(f, α, k, m) for a value α of the evaluators choice.
Our denition of DFS limits the delegation capabilities of the evaluator. In particular, the signer species how an evaluator may delegate his signing rights.
Formal Description of a DFS scheme
A delegatable functional signature (DFS) scheme over a message space M, a key space K, and parameter spaces P f and P α is a signature scheme that additionally supports a controlled form of malleability and delegation. A DFS is described by a functionality F : (sk sig , pk sig ) ← KGen sig (pp, msk): The signature key generation algorithm outputs a secret signing key sk sig and a public signing key pk sig .
(sk ev , pk ev ) ← KGen ev (pp, msk): The evaluation key generation algorithm KGen ev outputs a secret evaluator key sk ev and a public evaluator key pk ev .
σ ← Sig(pp, sk sig , pk ev , f, m): The signing algorithm Sig outputs a signature σ on m, on which functions from the class f can be applied (or an error symbol
The evaluation algorithm outputs a derived signatureσ for m on the capability f , that can be modied using the evaluator key sk ev associated with pk ev , where (f , m ) ← F(λ, f, α, pk ev , m) (or an error symbol ⊥).
b ← Vf(pp, pk sig , pk ev , m, σ): The verication algorithm Vf outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
A DFS is correct if the verication algorithm outputs 1 for all honestly generated signatures and for all valid transformations of honestly generated signatures.
We refer to the extended edition [6] for a formal denition of our correctness.
Security Notions for DFS
In this section we dene unforgeability and privacy for delegatable functional signatures. In both cases we distinguish between outsider and insider attacks:
In an outsider attack, the adversary only knows both public keys, whereas an adversary launching an insider attack knows the private key of the evaluator. Informally we say that a delegatable functional signature scheme provides privacy if it is computationally hard to distinguish whether a signature was created by the signer or whether it was modied by the evaluator. In the following subsections we discuss the intuition behind each denition in more detail and provide formal denitions.
For the following security denitions we follow the concept of Bellare and Rogaway in dening the security notions as a game G(DFSS, F, A, λ) [12] . Each game G behaves as follows: First, it invokes an algorithm Initialize with the security parameter and sends its output to the algorithm A. Then it simulates A with oracle access to all specied algorithms Query[x] that are dened for G. It also allows A to call the algorithm Finalize once and ends as soon as Finalize is called. The output of Finalize is a boolean value and is also the output of G. Note that G is allowed to maintain state. We say that A wins the game if G(DFSS, F, A, λ) = 1.
Unforgeability
Intuitively, a delegatable functional signature scheme is unforgeable, if no adversary A is able to compute a fresh message-signature pair that is not trivially deducible from its knowledge. In the case of regular signature schemes this means that the attacker needs to compute a signature on a fresh message. The situation here is more complex, because our signatures are malleable and because several parties are involved (and they may even use malicious keys). We present three dierent unforgeability notions:
Unforgeability against outsider attacks. We model the outsider as an active adversary that knows the public keys (pk sig , pk ev ) and has oracle access to both the Sig and the Eval F algorithm. Our denition of unforgeability against outsider attacks resembles the traditional denition of unforgeability for signature schemes [32] , where the adversary knows the public-key and has access to a signing oracle.
Unforgeability against (weak/strong) insider attacks. Our second denition considers the case where the evaluator is malicious. We dene two dierent notions depending on the capabilities of the adversary. That is, our rst denition that we call unforgeability against weak insider attacks (or just insider attacks), gives the attacker access to an honestly generated private key sk ev . The second notion allows the adversary to choose its own private key(s) maliciously.
Note, that the attacker might choose these keys adaptively. We refer to this notion as unforgeability against strong insider attacks.
We model our notions by giving the adversary access to three dierent KGen oracles. An adversary that can only access Query[KGenP] to retrieve public keys is considered an outsider; an adversary that can access the oracle Query[KGenS] to retrieve one or more secret evaluator keys is considered an insider; an adversary that additionally can access the oracle Query[RegKey] to (adaptively) register its own (possibly malicious) evaluator keys is considered a strong insider (SInsider). All adversaries have access to the honestly generated public signer key pk sig . We keep track of the following sets: K C stores all key pairs, K A stores all public keys for which the adversaries knows the private key, and Q stores A's queries to both Query[Sign] and Query [Eval] . To handle the information that an adversary can trivially deduce from its queries, we dene the transitive closure for functionalities. Denition 2. (Transitive closure of functionality F). Given a functionality F, we dene the n-transitive closure F n of F on parameters (λ, (f, m)) recursively as follows:
We dene the transitive closure F * of F on parameters (λ, (f, m)) as
Note that the transitive closure F * on (λ, (f, m)) might not be eciently computable (and thus a challenger for Unf might not be ecient).
Although it is not necessary to compute the closure explicitly in our case, one could require a DFSS to provide an ecient algorithm Check−F such that Check−F(λ, f, m, m
Initialize (λ):
store (pp, msk, sksig, pk sig )
retrieve (pp, msk) Remark: We assume implicitly that f can be extracted from σ using sk ev from any valid query to Eval F . We believe that this is a reasonable assumption, because the evaluator that transforms a signature should learn the value f , as it describes the capabilities of the evaluator. In fact, our construction (Section 5) satises this property. For both outsiders (K A = ∅) and insiders (K A = ∅), we require that the forgery message m * is a fresh message, i.e., it has not been signed by the challenger, which is formally expressed by (·, m * , ·, ·) = Q. Moreover, for insider adversaries, the forgery must not be trivially deducible from previously issued signatures (f, m, pk ev * , σ) for keys pk ev * ∈ K A . Observe that a dierent public key pk ev might have been used when signing a message as compared to when verifying the resulting signature.
We leave it up to the signature scheme to decide whether a signature can verify under dierent evaluator keys. As a matter of fact: There can be schemes where Vf does not need to receive pk ev at all.
Relations between the unforgeability notions
The three notions of unforgeability describe a hierarchy of adversaries. It is intuitive, that security against outsider attacks does not imply security against insider attacks, as the key sk ev of the evaluator can indeed leak enough information to construct the signature key sk sig out of it. However, although an insider adversary is stronger than an outsider adversary, making use of the additional oracle can weaken an adversary. Consider a scheme that leaks the secret signing key sk sig with every signature, and that has only one valid public evaluator key pk ev , that allows an insider with the respective secret key sk ev to change messages inside signatures to arbitrary values. An insider that received sk ev can not create a forgery, since every message he creates after receiving at least one signature is not considered a forgery: he could have computed them trivially using Eval F . Without invoking Query[KGenS], the adversary can request a signature and subsequently forge signatures for arbitrary messages, using the key sk sig he received with the signature. An S-Insider is again stronger than an insider or an outsider. A scheme can become insecure if a certain key pair (sk ev , pk ev ) is used that is highly unlikely to be an output of KGen ev (e.g., one of them is 0 λ ). (ii) the proposition follows analogously.
Proposition 1 (EU-X-A-Implications

Privacy
Our privacy notion for DFS says that it should be hard to distinguish the following two signatures:
a signature on a message m that has been derived from a signature on a challenge message m by one or more applications of Eval F .
a fresh signature on m , where (·, m ) ← F(. . .) was computed via one or more applications of F to m.
This indistinguishability should hold even against an adversary with oracle access to KGen ev , Sig and Eval F that can choose which transformations are to be applied to which challenge message m and under which evaluator keys (even if they are known to the adversary), as long as the resulting signature is not delegated to the adversary.
Analogously to our denitions of unforgeability, we distinguish between three dierent types of adversaries, depending on their strength: outsiders, insiders and strong insiders. We model this by giving the adversary access to three dierent KGen oracles that are dened analogously to Denition 3 in Section 3.1. In the following denition, the set K C stores all key pairs, K A contains all public keys for which the adversaries knows the private key, and K X stores the keys used in the challenge oracle Query[Sign-F ].
Initialize (λ): Proof. The proposition follows analogously to the proof for Proposition 1.
Possibility and Impossibility of DFS From OWFs
In this section we investigate the instantiability of DFS. In particular, we are interested in understanding which security property is harder to achieve. If we counter-intuitively are not interested in unforgeability, naturally we can construct a delegatable functional signature scheme DFSS unconditionally. A signature on m simply consists of the string this is a signature for m. Obviously, this construction satises privacy against strong insiders in the sense of Denition 4
but not even unforgeability against outsiders.
Similarly, if we are not interested in privacy, DFS schemes can easily be constructed similarly to the construction in [15] . We assume a signature scheme S that is based on any one-way function. Now, the idea is that the signer simply signs a tuple consisting of the message together with the capability f and the public verication key of an evaluator. When evaluating, an evaluator adds his own signature on the previous signature together with α and the key of the following evaluator to the original signature. The verication procedure only accepts a signature if the signed trace of evaluations and delegations is legitimate w.r.t. the functionality F. This scheme trivially satises unforgeability against strong insiders (cf. Denition 3) but none of our privacy notions. Thus, we obtain the following simple result: Theorem 1. If one-way functions exist, then there exists an unforgeable delegatable functional signature scheme.
Impossibility of DFS from OWPs
In this section we prove an impossibility result showing that (D)FS cannot be constructed from OWP in a black-box way. The basic idea of our impossibility is to build a blind signature scheme in a black-box way. Since it is known that blind signature cannot be constructed from OWP only using black-box techniques [35] , this implies that (D)FS cannot be constructed from OWF as well. Blind Signatures and Their Security A blind signature scheme is an interactive protocol between a signer S, holding a secret key sk BS and a user U who wishes to obtain a signature on a message m such that the user cannot create any additional signatures and such that S remains oblivious about this message. We refer to the extended edition [6] for formal denitions of commitment schemes and blind signatures.
Building Blind Signatures from (D)FS The basic idea of our construction is
as follows. The user chooses a message m, commits to the message and sends the commitment c on m to the signer. The signer signs the commitment, using a delegatable functional signature scheme and sends the signature σ c back to the user. The user then calls Eval F with the open information o m to derive a signature on m. Given a commitment scheme C = (Commit, Open) and a delegatable functional signature scheme DFSS = (Setup, KGen sig , KGen ev , Sig, Eval F , Vf) for functionality F C , where F C (λ, 1, α, pk ev , m) := (0, Open(α, m)), we construct a blind signature scheme BS = (KG BS , S, U , Vf BS ) as follows. (msk, pp) ← Setup(λ) (sk sig , pk sig ) ← KGen sig (pp, msk) (sk ev , pk ev ) ← KGen ev (pp, msk) (sk BS , pk BS ) ← (sk sig , (pp, pk sig , pk ev , sk ev )) Signing. The protocol for U to obtain a signature on message m is depicted in Theorem 2. If DFSS = (Setup, KGen sig , KGen ev , Sig, Eval F , Vf) is an unforgeable and private delegatable signature scheme (both against insider attacks) and C = (Commit, Open) is a commitment scheme which is both computationally binding and hiding, then the interactive signature scheme BS = (KG BS , S, U , Vf BS ) as dened above is unforgeable and blind.
Intuitively, unforgeability holds because the user can only obtain a signature on m if he calls Eval F on an authenticated commitment. This follows from the binding of the commitment scheme and from the unforgeability of the DFS.
Blindness follows directly from the hiding property of the commitment scheme and from the privacy of our DFS. Note that the impossibility result of [34] rules out blind signature schemes that are secure against semi-honest adversaries.
We prove this theorem with the following two propositions. For the analysis observe that the functionality F C only applies the Open algorithm to the signed message and only if f = 1 has been set. So for every signature σ i that A received, only one application of Eval F is allowed and only the Open algorithm can be applied. Since C is a binding commitment scheme, every commitment can only be opened to a unique message, except for a negligible error probability. However, this means that one of the signatures σ * i must be a forgery for DFSS as it is either a signature on a new message, or an evaluation of a function that has not been allowed (and thus is not in the transitive hull Proof. We show this proposition via a game-based proof. We start with the original game Blind BS S * (λ) for blindness and modify it until we reach a game in which the adversary can not observe any information that might help him in guessing the bit b.
In the following proof, as well as in subsequent proofs, we assign a number to each line where the rst digit marks the game and the remaining digits the line in this game (e.g., 234 marks the 34 th line of game 2). All lines that are not explicitly stated are as they were dened in the last game that dened them.
We refer to Figure 5 for a description of the games. Proof. This follows from the hiding property of the commitment scheme. If there is an ecient, malicious signer A, which is able to distinguish the two games, then we can use it to break the hiding property of C.
In Game G 2 the bit b is never used. The commitments and all signatures are completely independent of b. Thus, the probability that
. Since the games are (pairwise) computationally indistinguishable, the proposition holds.
Combining Theorem 2 and the impossibility result of [35] (which is based on the work of Barak and Mahmoody [7] ), we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. (Delegatable) functional signature schemes that are unforgeable and private against insider adversaries cannot be build from one-way permutations in a black-box way.
Remark. Since this construction did not use the delegation property of the delegatable functional signature scheme, it should be possible to construct blind signatures from functional signatures, as dened by [15] . A DFS that is unforgeable and private against outsider adversaries is not ruled out by this corollary.
Exploring whether the impossibility also holds in this case would be interesting.
Bounded DFS From Trapdoor Permutations
In this section we construct a bounded delegatable functional signature scheme DFSS as dened in Section 2.1, where we put an a-priori bound on the number of evaluations. Our construction is based on (regular) unforgeable signature schemes, a public-key encryption scheme, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. It is well known that these primitives can be constructed from (doubly enhanced) trapdoor permutations. Formal denition of the underlying primitives can be found in the extended edition of this paper [6] .
Our scheme
Our construction follows the encrypt and proof strategy and is completely general with respect to eciently computable functionalities F with the exception Setup(1 λ ) :
KGensig (pp, msk) :
KGenev (pp, msk) :
parse pp = (CRS, pp S , pp E , ek) parse pk ev = (vkF , ek) parse sksig = (sskS , pk sig ))
with ωn = (rS , k) and
Vf(pp, pk sig , pk ev , m, σ) :
EvalF (pp, skev, pk sig , α, m, pk ev , σ) : , pk sig , pk ev , S, d, m) if pk ev = (vkF , ek) belongs to skev Fig. 6 . Construction of a DFSS that F may allow only for up to n applications of Eval F . We let the signer choose how many applications he allows by dening f as a tuple (f , k) ∈ P f ×{0, . . . , n}.
We achieve the strong notion of privacy under chosen function attack (CFA) ac- know, that the signature originates from the signer), even the second evaluator in the chain will be unable to nd out more than its predecessor and the number of applications of Eval F that are still allowed. Figure 6 shows the construction in more detail.
Given a signature scheme S = (Setup S , KGen S , Sig S , Vf S ) with a simple key generation algorithm and with signatures of equal length, an encryption scheme E = (Setup E , KGen E , Enc E , Dec E ) and a zero-knowledge scheme NIZK = (KGen NIZK , P NIZK , Vf NIZK ) for languages in NP we construct a delegatable functional signature scheme DFSS as follows: We dene a recursive class of languages L i , where L n : x n = (pp S , pp E , pk sig , pk ev , S, m, CRS, f, σ) ∈ L n means that there exists a witness ω n = (r, k) such that pk sig = (vk S , ek) ∧ s k = Enc E (pp E , ek, (σ, (f, m, pk ev , k)); r) ∧ Vf S (pp S , vk S , (f, m, pk ev , k), σ) = 1 and where L i for 0 ≤ i < n : x i = (pp S , pp E , pk sig , pk ev , S, m, CRS, f, σ) ∈ L i if there exists a witness ω i = (r, Π, pk ev , m , f , α) s.t. pk sig = (vk S , ek) and
The signer proves that x = (pp = (CRS, pp S , pp E ), pk sig , pk ev = (vk F , ek), S, d, m) ∈ L, where L contains tuples for which there exists a witness ω = (f, i, r d )
Security
Concerning security, we show the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If E is a public key encryption scheme that is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA-2), S a length preserving unforgeable signature scheme with a simple key generation, and NIZK is a sound non-interactive proof scheme that is zero knowledge, the construction presented in this section is unforgeable against outsider and (strong) insider attacks and secure against chosen function attacks (CFA) against outsiders and (strong) insiders
Proof. The theorem follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Lemma 1. If E is a public key encryption scheme, S a length preserving unforgeable signature scheme with a simple key generation (i.e., not requiring a master secret key), and NIZK is a sound non-interactive proof scheme, then the construction DFSS presented in Section 5 is unforgeable against outsider and (strong) insider attacks according to Denition 3.
Given an adversary A that breaks the unforgeability of our construction we construct an ecient adversary B that breaks the underlying signature scheme.
Proof. By Proposition 1 it suces to show unforgeability against an S-Insider adversary. Assume towards contradiction that DFSS is not unforgeable against strong insider attacks. Then there exists an ecient adversary A := A S-Insider that makes at most p(λ) many steps for a polynomial p and that wins the game Unf (DFSS, F, A S-Insider , λ), formalized in Denition 3, with non-negligible probability. Since A makes at most p(λ) many steps, A invokes the oracle Query [KgenP] at most p(λ) many times. We show how to build an adversary B that runs A in a black-box way in order to break the unforgeability of S with non-negligible probability. In the following we denote the values and the oracles that the challenger C from the game Unf (S, B, λ) provides to B with the index C.
The algorithm B, upon receiving as input a tuple (pp C , vk C ) from Initialize C , simulates a challenger for the game Unf (DFSS, F, A, λ) . First, the algorithm B
generates the public parameters and the master public/private key-pair, com- ε) and sets pk sig := vk S .
The algorithm B embeds its own challenge key vk C in a randomly chosen position z ∈ {0, . . . , p(λ)}; if z = 0, then B replaces vk S by vk C . Finally, B runs a black-box simulation of A on input (pp, pk sig ), where pk sig = vk S or pk sig = vk C , depending on z and B simulates the four oracles Query as follows. First, B generates a key pair for encryption and decryption (dk, ek) ← KGen E (pp E , msk E ). Then it behaves dierently depending on i: If i = z, then B sends vk C to A. Otherwise, B generates a new key-pair (sk ev , pk ev ) ← KGen S (pp C , ε), stores this pair, and sends pk ev to A. If z = 0, this local computation is not possible since B replaced vk S with vk C . Thus, the algorithm B sets h k := (f, m, pk ev , k) and invokes Query[Sig] C (h k ).
It sets σ k to the output of the challenger and otherwise proceeds as above. Since the keys are identically distributed, this still is a perfect simulation.
Since all messages that B sends to A are identically distributed to the messages that Unf (DFSS, F, A, λ) sends to A, the algorithm B perfectly simulates a challenger for Unf (DFSS, F, A, λ).
Claim. Whenever A produces a forgery, then with probability at least Figure 7 ), it would output 1.
hull F * (λ, (f, m)). Also, there was no query to Query[Eval](pk ev , α, m, pk ev , σ ) for an adversary key pk ev such that f was extracted from σ and such that m * is in the transitive hull F * (λ, (f , m )) for (f , m ) := F(λ, f, α, pk ev , m).
If the NIZK Π veries then there is a signature that veries under pk sig and that marks the start of the delegation chain. Let σ k be this signature for a value h k = (f, m, pk ev , k). The NIZK makes sure that m * is in the transitive hull F * (λ, (f, m)) and that all transformations are legitimized by the previous ones (depending on the intermediate α's).
We distinguish the following cases: 
, where f 0 = f and m 0 = m.
Thus, B never sent h i to Query[Sig] C and thus, σ i and h i fulll our claim. i = k: There was a call to Query[Sig] with parameters (pk ev , (f, k), m). And for all 0 < j ≤ k there was a call to Query[Eval] with parameters (pk ev j , α j , β j , m j , the value z that B has chosen in the beginning. As vk C is randomly placed in the set of possible honest keys (p(λ) many), B produces a forgery for vk C with probability at least
For the analysis of the success of B let us assume that A produces a forgery with a non-negligible probability. However, by Claim 5.2, whenever A produces a forgery, there is a chance of 1 p(λ)+1 that B will produce a forgery. Since A is assumed to succeed with a non-negligible probability, B will also succeed with a non-negligible probability, losing a polynomial factor of p(λ) + 1. Since B is an ecient algorithm, this concludes the proof. Lemma 2. If E is a public key encryption scheme that is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA-2), and the interactive proof scheme NIZK is zero knowledge, then the construction DFSS presented in Section 5 is secure against chosen function attacks (CFA) as in Denition 4. 
041 sk−t ← EncE (pp E , ek, (ςk−t, hk−t); rs k−t ) 042 For j ∈ {0, . . . , n} \ {k − t} Claim. Game G 0 and Game G 1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. The indistinguishability follows from the fact that NIZK is zero knowledge. If a PPT distinguisher could distinguish between Game G 0 and Game G 1 , we could construct an ecient distinguisher for NIZK.
Game G 1 ⇒ Game G 2 : The game Game G 2 is identical to Game G 1 except for the fact that now S and d contain only descriptions of zero-strings: we put encryptions of zero strings in all s j for j ∈ {0, . . . , n} instead of leaving an encryption of a signature ς k−t together with its message h k−t at position k − t and in an encryption of a zero string in d instead of an encryption of ς k−t together with f t and k − t. Proof. If the games could be distinguished by a PPT distinguisher, then we could construct an ecient distinguisher that breaks the CCA-2 security of E.
We distinguish two cases:
The simulator S = (S 0 , S 1 ) behaves dierently. Although the simulatability of the NIZK only is dened for valid statements x ∈ L R , a simulator that can distinguish with a non-negligible probability between a normal S or d (as in Game G 1 ) and an S or d that consists only of encryptions of zero-strings (as in Game G 2 ) can also be used to break the CCA-2 security of E.
The adversary distinguishes the games. If the adversary is able to distinguish Game G 1 and Game G 2 with a non-negligible probability, it can be used to break the CCA-2 security of E.
Thus, Game G 1 and Game G 2 are computationally indistinguishable. Game G 2 ⇒ Game G 3 : In Game G 3 , the bit b is set to 1 instead of 0. However, b is never used explicitly in the game. Moreover we always use the signature generated by Eval F (from line 33) instead of the fresh signature (from line 50).
Claim. Game G 2 and Game G 3 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. In both cases S and d are encryptions of zero strings (under the same keys) and in both cases Π is a proof generated by S 1 for the same statement x = (pp, pk sig , pk ev [t], S, d, m t ). Since S 1 does not receive a witness, the proofs are based on the same arguments.
Game G 3 ⇒ Game Game G 4 and Game G 5 , we could construct an ecient distinguisher for NIZK.
As we have shown, the games Game G 0 and Game G 5 are computationally indistinguishable. However, Game G 0 perfectly models the case, where an adversary plays against a challenger for CFA when b = 0, whereas Game G 5 perfectly models the case, where an adversary plays against a challenger for CFA when b = 1. 
